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3This lecture is in English not only because I think that English is by now the natural
language for research in computer science, but also because my family, my sister
and some of my international PhD students are here. I want to thank them for this
and I think they have the good right to understand what I’ll be saying. 
I’ll also try to make this lecture comprehensible by a non-technical public, at the
cost of some scientific imprecision. So I’ll call a cryptographic key a password, and
commit a couple of other heresies.
Introduction
4I want to start from the old example of the ‘man-in-the-middle’ attack. I know
some of the researchers here will immediately think this is terribly old-fashioned,
but there are a couple of very up-to-date lessons we can learn from it. 
What is a ‘man-in-the-middle’ attack? The most illustrative example of it is the
famous ‘MIG in the middle’ [1] reported by Ross Anderson in his book. As
Anderson himself admits, this is perhaps not historically accurate, but its
principles are certainly valid, and it is now part of the security folklore.
The story has it that there were two parties at war with each other in Africa: on the
one hand South Africa and Namibia, and on the other hand Angola supported by
Cuba. Both parties had air forces and radar. Now, one of the concerns you have
when you use both radar and airplanes is to have an accurate system to
distinguish friend from foe: when you see an airplane trace on your radar, you
want to know whether you should shoot at it or let it pass. For this purpose, the
South African Air Force had allegedly adopted a rather nifty scheme based on
cryptography, which worked more or less as follows:
The air base and the airplanes all shared a secret password (a cryptographic key,
actually) p that could be used to encipher and decipher messages. Every time the
radar detected an airplane in its range it would send a message consisting of a
randomly generated secret code, enciphered using the secret password, asking
the airplane to decipher the message. Since only friendly airplanes were in
possession of the secret password, they were the only ones able to decipher the
original message. So if the airplane detected by the radar was able to decipher the
message, everyone at the air base would assume it to be a friendly one, and let 
it pass. 
As it happens, this assumption was based on wrong premises, and here is what
apparently happened at that point in history. 
The enemy (that is, the Angolans, with the support of Cuba) stationed a few MIGs
just outside the Namibian border. These MIGs sat and waited until a flight of
South African bombers crossed the border to raid a target in Angola. When this
happened, they took off, but rather than going after the South African airplanes,
they entered the Namibian airspace to hit a South African camp in Northern
Namibia. The South African radars detected the MIGs, but let them pass. 
A lesson we have not learned 
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So how did the MIGs manage to get through the South African defenses? By
pretending they were friends and not enemies, and they managed to convince the
SAAF of this as follows. As soon as the SAAF radar detected them, it challenged
them with a new random message enciphered with the secret password. 
The MIGs could not decipher the message themselves, but what they did was to
immediately relay this message to their own radar, which in turn sent it to the
South African airplanes which were at that moment in Angolan airspace. The
South African airplanes didn’t know any better than that they had to decipher 
the message. 
Which is just what they were programmed to do every time they received such a
communication. So that’s what they did, and they sent the deciphered messages
back to the Angolan radar, which in turn sent them to the MIGs, which in turn sent
them to the South African radar, which then assumed that the MIGs were actually
friendly planes. And therefore allowed them to pass. This whole relay chain may
have taken place in just a few hundredths of a second, so there was actually no
way for the South African radar to know any better. 
So, this is a ‘man-in-the-middle’ attack: someone convincing you of being
someone else by relaying some of the message and the questions you send him to
the one he pretends to be. Indeed, the MIGs would have never been able to defeat
the South African radar without the help of the South African airplanes!
This is a very, very old kind of security problem: the history of failures of security
protocols is indeed a surprisingly long one. Security protocols have been around
for thirty years now, and people have started finding literally hundreds of crucial
bugs in them starting already in 1995, when Gavin Lowe analyzed the security of a
well-known security protocol (Needham-Schroeder’s Protocol) by using a model
checker. He did not manage to prove the protocol right, but instead he found a
fundamental failure in it, which in that case could be easily fixed. The protocol was
a very well known three-liner, and one of the interesting parts of the story is that
this flaw had remained unnoticed under everyone’s eyes for almost twenty years.
A new research area was born: the application of formal methods to security. 
In the subsequent years researchers all over the world had fun cracking all sorts 
of security protocols, and only a few of them survived the battlefield. 
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By 2003, we had enough knowledge and tools to honestly say that we knew how
to design and debug security protocols. So from that point on things should have
gone better. But they did not, and – among various failures found after that – 
I would like to mention a bug in the public-key version of the widely-used Kerberos
algorithm found by Cervesato et al. in 2005, and – dulcis in fundo – an incredible
bug in a single sign-on system used worldwide that was found just a few months
ago by Luca Viganò, Luca Compagna and Alessandro Armando and the team of the
Avantassar project (I am not allowed to give details at the time of writing). The bug
is very similar to the one found in 1995 in the Needham-Schroeder protocol, in
that it truly allows someone to impersonate someone else (also in the practical
implementation), and it should not have been around in 2008.
So the first lesson we learn from this is not quite about research but about
education. When you look at security, Murphy’s law is a rule:
Unless you can prove your protocol works correctly, it is not going to work. 
And if you can prove your protocol works correctly, you are not even halfway
through the process of building a secure system. I hope the Dutch government 
will take this into consideration when addressing high-impact issues such as
rekeningrijden (or road pricing).
7So, security protocols can have design flaws, which is a problem. But this does not
mean that if we ever managed to fix all the flaws of all the security protocols out
there, we would be safer once and for all. This is not so, because security is
always based on a chain of elements linked to each other, and somewhere along
the chain there is usually a weak link. Take for instance something we all use:
internet banking. Banks in the Netherlands offer excellent internet banking
services, which are much more secure and advanced than those offered in other
countries (like Italy, for instance). Really state-of-the-art stuff. Still, they are
vulnerable to a reasonably simple yet surprisingly effective ‘man-in-the-middle’
attack. In this case, this is commonly called a ‘man-in-the-browser‘ attack. So let’s
see in a minute how internet banking works with an example. 
1. First, once I am logged-in, I type in the computer my order, say “please
transfer 5000 euro to bank account number 12345 belonging to John Smith”. 
2. Then the computer tells the bank “Sandro wants to transfer 5000 euro to
bank account number 12345 belonging to John Smith”.
3. At that point the bank wants to make sure that it really is me who gave the
order. So it sends a secret message, enciphered with a secret password, to
my computer. That is the number I see on the screen. 
4. I put my card in the bank’s reader, I type in my PIN code, and then the
number I see on the screen. Then I read on the screen of the reader the
response to the first message, and I type the response in the computer. 
5. The computer then sends this response to the bank, which checks if this is
correct. The first message (the ‘challenge’) can only be correctly deciphered
by someone who has a reader together with (a) my bank card and (b) my PIN
code. So if the answer is correct, the bank can safely assume that the order
actually came from me, and not from someone else trying to impersonate
me.
So then the bank is sure that the order comes from me. But what can go wrong
here is that my browser (Internet Explorer, Firefox etc.) at step (2) modifies the
order slightly as follows: “Sandro wants to transfer 100 euro to bank account
number 12345 belonging to John Smith and 4900 euro to bank account number
54321 belonging to Mr. X”. The rest of the protocol remains unmodified, and 
Accepting reality
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I have no way of checking that the order being carried out is not the one I
intended. Of course, a browser does not usually modify bank orders, unless it has
been maliciously hacked by someone, for instance by a virus or Trojan horse. But
hacking a browser is not that difficult, and if the hacking has been done well, then
when I ask it to show all transactions I have done in a certain period, it will hide
the payment to Mr. X and show the original amount on the payment to John Smith.
We have had a student develop such a hack, and the code he needed to write was
less than a thousand lines of code long.
Should we stop using internet banking? No. We don’t stop driving cars simply
because it is dangerous, do we?
Should we worry? Yes. Just like we worry about the possibility that people may
break into our house. 
Can we do something about this? Certainly yes. To start with we can use one
computer to visit untrusted sites and download untrusted software from the
internet, and another computer to do business and internet banking. Again, the
challenge here is education and awareness, and I think the Netherlands is doing 
a good job at that. 
And then the crucial question:
Can we make 100% sure that we will not be the victim of such an attack? No. It can
happen to everyone, me included. The fundamental reason for this is that our
operating systems (XP, Vista, Linux, MacOS) and the programs we use everyday
are too complex to be trustworthy, and no matter how much effort the software
houses put into securing them, they will always contain tens of thousands of
vulnerabilities which can be exploited by hackers to do all sorts of things, like
hacking the browser as we just saw, or installing a keylogger which will make a
note of my password and my credit card number and mail them back home to the
hacker. 
So the sad truth is that 100% security is unachievable. 
9So far we’ve had a tiny little taste of the past and the present of security. What
about the future? 
Computer security presents a number of formidable challenges that will keep
researchers’ lives interesting for years to come. What my personal challenge is
about is achieving reasonable insecurity. 
To explain this, let me take a step back and give a simple example. Every day in
our work we deal with electronic documents which should not be disclosed to just
anyone: like my electronic health record, a new marketing strategy, a new idea for
an industrial product. On the one hand, to be useful, this data needs to circulate
around the organization we work in, like the company, the hospital etc. On the
other hand, to guarantee its security we require some kind of policy enforcement:
we want to make sure that the data is used and distributed according to some
policies we have agreed upon. This policy states who may see and/or modify the
document. It could say for instance that a certain letter may be seen only by senior
management. Computer systems help us to guarantee policy enforcement in all
sorts of ways, ranging from access control to document management systems.
These systems are also there to guarantee that confidential data does not end up
in the wrong hands. However, they work only as long as we remain within our
domain: our office, our institute, our hospital. So within a single company, things
go well. But what happens when my company cooperates with another company?
(Let’s say it outsources part of the work.) In that case, I have to send my
documents to a different domain, and what can our computer systems do to
guarantee policy enforcement in this new setting?
Nothing at all. Once a document has left my domain, I have lost all control of it. 
I may wish that my letter be read only by senior managers, but I have no
guarantee that this policy will be followed.
So what do we do in this situation? We place our hopes on lawyers and auditors,
and write immensely complex non-disclosure agreements, which promise the most
awful consequences should the documents we share not be treated confidentially. 
This solution is of course not satisfactory; it only shows our inability to deal with
the problem. I think that – when it comes to policy enforcement – we are still in the
middle ages of security. 
Capitalizing
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The fundamental reason why access control systems are of no help across
organizations is that they work in a preventive manner: they are designed to block
all actions that are not explicitly authorized before they take place. This makes
them extremely powerful, but also inflexible. Moreover, we have just seen that
100% security does not exist anyhow, so why don’t we look at solutions that
guarantee less security but also work across domains?
Having preventive policy enforcement systems in our ‘liquid society’ is also quite
unreasonable: Imagine the world as it would be if law enforcement was primarily
done by preventive means. Some ‘infrastructure’ would have to stop us from doing
all sorts of illegal things: speeding, smoking in cafés etc. Reflecting on this, we
quickly realize that this ‘infrastructure’ would necessarily be so intrusive and
inflexible that we would hardly be able to do anything useful, let alone have 
any fun. 
In my opinion, one of the great security challenges ahead of us is what I call audit-
based compliance control. Which is a way of doing compliance control, but by
deterring rather than preventing infringements; that is, in an a posteriori fashion,
as opposed to all present approaches, which work on an a priori basis. The
principle is quite simple: rather than preventing illegitimate actions, we want to 
be able to detect them. So the responsibility of acting according to the agreed
policies does not lie with the system (which cannot prevent all illegal actions
anyhow), but rests with the user. What the system does is make a detailed log of
its actions, so that if policies are not complied with, there is an effective way of
finding out who has infringed them.
So in the presence of such a system, if Alice wants to share a new secret idea with
Bob, who works at a different company, all she has to do is couple the document
containing the idea with a policy saying that it is for Bob’s eyes only, and send it 
to him. If Bob does not follow the policy, the logging system in place at Bob’s
premises will record it, and when the auditor visits Bob to check if he behaved
correctly, he will be able to find the infringement. Clearly, Alice has no complete
guarantee that Bob will actually follow the policy, but with the present systems
she has no guarantee anyhow, and 100% security – as we have seen – is not
something of this world. 
The design and deployment of such a system is much more challenging than it
may at first appear. There are three main problems: 
1. Bridging the gap between the high-level policies and the low-level events
that we can log. If Bob wants to send to Charlie the secret document he
received from Alice, he can use a number of cryptographic tools to hide his
actions from the logging systems. 
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2. Finding the one infringement in a log containing millions of entries is quite a
bit more difficult than finding a needle in a haystack. 
3. Privacy. Deep logging of everyone’s actions is not quite privacy-friendly.
People should be accountable for their wrong actions, but this does not
entitle auditors to have a full record of everyone’s private life. 
These are three difficult problems that one day will be solved and will lead us to
the realization of a completely new way of doing compliance control.
So far for the most challenging of my research dreams. I am confident that
Eindhoven University of Technology, and 3TU.Federation, will be a wonderful
environment in which to tackle it. 
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The next thing I want to talk about briefly is education – which next to research is
the other reason for the existence of universities and professors in the first place. 
There are some premises I want to make.
First, the Netherlands is a knowledge country. The Dutch government and the
majority of us think and hope that the Dutch high-tech industry will be a winning
factor in guaranteeing the maintenance of our level of economical prosperity. 
We are now a rich country; and we hope that technology will help us stay wealthy. 
To this end, the Dutch government is investing billions of euro in research and
scientific innovation. As a scientist I am very pleased with this.
Secondly, I think we have good reasons to be happy about the quality of the Dutch
universities. 
So far the good news. Now the bad news:
First, despite good funding and good universities, Dutch college students are
generally not attracted by a high-tech career. This can easily be demonstrated by
looking at the number of students enrolling at technical faculties. 
Second, Dutch students usually do not have the right preparation and attitude to
succeed in a high-tech career. They are often not well-prepared when they arrive at
university. It is clear that they are not accustomed to making big efforts for
learning and mastering new concepts, particularly abstract ones. 
Why is this happening? There are various reasons, many of which are beyond my
own analytical abilities, and beyond the scope of this short dissertation. 
Nevertheless, I would like to point out a couple of them. 
Education
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I am now going to talk about education in the Netherlands, but not at universities.
I am going to focus on the range of schools between the elementary schools and
the high schools. 
From the viewpoint of the Dutch knowledge society, Dutch schools are a
catastrophe.  
Honestly, it took me a long time to understand why. Reality is in this case so far
from my perception of how schools should be that it truly took me years before 
I became fully aware of the situation. And suddenly, one day, I realized something.
Well, actually I read it in the newspaper, in one of the thousands of articles about
Dutch education. This is the sentence that glued my feet to the ground:
“In de informatiemaatschappij gaat het niet om kennis. Vaardigheden, dat is
belangrijk.”
“In the information society, knowledge is not important, competences are.”
This sad, ugly, and in my opinion wrong statement is directly translated by people
who in my opinion are ruining generations of potential scientists in the motto of a
large part of the Dutch school system. 
“Knowledge is not important, competences are.”
For example, it is not important to learn – say – why Pythagoras’ theorem works. 
It is important to know how to use a calculator to compute the length of the
hypotenuse. 
The sad consequence of this viewpoint is that our kids learn less and less, do little
or no homework, and when they eventually need to study something, like – say –
the history of World War II, they do not really apprehend it, but are usually asked
to write a report on it. So that our typical young student sits a few hours at the
computer, copying and pasting from all sorts of sources on the internet, and 
re-editing it until he has created – it must be said – a very nice report.
The result is that the student learns to use his brain at meta-level: the knowledge
on World War II went from one document to the other, through the computer, and
never fully entered –let alone settled in – the brain of the student. What he learned
is how to glue the pieces together, and how to wrap it up well, but the personal
involvement in the heart of the matter is minimal. Students ‘handle’ and ‘manage’
The Dutch school system
14 prof.dr. Sandro Etalle
knowledge, rather than apprehending it, rather than making it theirs, rather than
getting deep into the heart of the matter. Also, the scientific quality of the
information they deal with is often very low, a fact that prevents them from
developing a healthy critical sense with respect to the various sources.
Some schools are now abolishing books in favor of laptops. This is hideous. 
We have to stop this. 
Let me now open a short parenthesis: I have been very lucky to be allowed to go
to Italy for a one-year sabbatical together with my whole family. So my children
Max and Luca (at that time 6 and 8 years of age) went to the Italian school for one
year, which is – to say the least – very classical in its approach: lots of facts, data,
and homework. For the sake of truth, they did not like the homework part.
Nevertheless, all of a sudden they started coming home from school with lots of
stories to tell us, about prehistory, the Romans, biology, about all sorts of things.
They enjoyed learning and were absolutely delighted to share this with us.
Especially when they could teach their parents something they had forgotten. It
was a joy to see how happy they were to learn new things. (By the way, here I am
not saying that Italian schools are better than Dutch ones. This is not true in many
respects, and is not the point anyhow.)
Coming back to Dutch schools, here we have intelligent children who love to learn,
we have millions of potential young scientists around us, and what do we teach
them at school? Skills, competences, vaardigheden. A true waste of talent. 
As if what they wanted from us was to learn ‘competences’.
As if they enjoyed that. 
As if – and this is perhaps more important from the sociopolitical viewpoint –
having an army of teenagers who are very skilled at writing portfolios would help
the Netherlands as a knowledge country. It does not. We do not need a country of
report-writers, we need a country of scientists. 
So, please, let us throw away all this nonsense. If we want to build the knowledge
society there is one thing that our school has to teach our children: 
Passion. 
The passion for arts, for math, for gymnastics, for music, for the languages, for
literature, for developing whatever talents children may possess. The school is
there to give young men and women the tools to deploy their potential, and these
tools are based on knowledge. Because it is hard to become a passionate
musician if you don’t learn the notes first. 
If we show kids how beautiful mathematics can be, rather than just teaching them
how to use some counting tricks, we have the chance that when they have to go to
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university they’ll choose something beautiful like math, physics and computer
science, rather than something else just because it gives them a good job. 
In my case, I studied music and math, because I thought they were the most
beautiful things I could learn. At the time I had to choose my study, I had no
greater aspiration than developing and enjoying the arts I was good at (and
sciences – particularly math - have a lot to do with art, because the reason why we
like them is that they are beautiful).
So, what can we do? Well, to teach passion we need passionate teachers. But that
is not a problem: schools are full of them. What we need to do is to allow them to
teach. And to allow them to demand that students actually learn something. I want
to stress this point once again: I strongly believe that Dutch teachers are good,
passionate and well-prepared. It is the system that does not allow them to work
well. 
I am also not saying that schools need to be more difficult than they are now. 
Look for instance at American high schools. They are certainly not more
challenging than Dutch ones, but they do whatever it takes to develop the talents
of their students. Something that – here – we have completely forgotten.
This brings me to the second point I wanted to make about Dutch schools. 
Allow me another parenthesis. This time about diversity. In the US, if a student is
very good at something but he is at the same time a bit weird, then the school will
tend to concentrate on his talent, and will help him at developing it. Chances are
that teachers will put him forward as a bright example to be followed. In the US,
being weird and brilliant is pretty cool. 
At Dutch schools it is hard to be different. If you are weird and brilliant the school
will put more effort into correcting the fact that you are weird (with psychologists,
committee meetings and remedial teachers) than into stimulating you because
you are brilliant. And the even sadder truth of the matter is that even if you are not
weird but simply brilliant, showing this is often not appreciated. Not until you are
– finally – at university. Chances are that – before then – the ‘system’ will tolerate
you and that other students will isolate you. I have seen too many talented
students who have had a very hard time throughout high school. They could finally
be proud of their talent only when they reached university. Which is too late for
many of them. 
Too often I have reason to believe that one of the goals of Dutch schools is to
make all students in a way ‘equal’ (within the given school system, MBO, HAVO,
VWO…). It sounds honorable, but it is wrong. They should instead make an effort
to make all students different, and happy to be so. 
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So please let us do our best to throw away the old adagio: “doe maar normaal,
want dan doe je al gek genoeg”. Wij hebben heel veel gekken nodig om ons
mooie kennisland in stand te houden! 
Ladies and gentlemen, it is nice to know. Period. 
But we need to teach this to our kids as early as we can. 
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This is for me the most important part of this speech, so please bear with me. 
It is only right for me to start thanking my parents and family. 
Cara mamma, caro papà. Avete sempre fatto tutto il possibile per assecondare e
sviluppare le mie passioni e per sostenermi nei miei sogni. Avete sempre messo i
miei interessi davanti ai vostri. Mi ritengo molto fortunato per questo, e senza il
vostro costante supporto non sarei qui a parlarvi in questo momento. Vi ringrazio
per questo di cuore. Silvana, tu sei sempre stata un’intelligentissima e importante
confidente e alter ego. Le nostre chiacchierate hanno sempre portato chiarezza nei
momenti di scelta.
Nicole, Max e Luca. Senza di voi non sarei qui, e anche se il lavoro ogni tanto mi
ruba più ore di quanto noi tutti vorremmo, la vostra presenza e il vostro affetto
sono il vero sestante della mia esistenza. Senza il vostro costante supporto e
comprensione non avrei mai potuto dedicarmi alla carriera accademica. Vi sono
immensamente grato del vostro sostegno, e del vostro amore. Grazie. 
Coming back to academia, while being reasonably intelligent is a prerequisite for
becoming a scientist, it takes more than that. There are very many people I should
thank for turning me into a scientist; here I mention three of them hoping for the
forgiveness of the others: my Italian professor Annalisa, my friend Maurizio, and in
particular, Krzysztof Apt. Dear Krzysztof, with your brightness and scientific
integrity, you have always been an epitome of the true scientist. Your example
constantly helps me to discern good from bad science. Also, I am grateful to the
CWI in Amsterdam for offering me an ideal place to develop my research interests
during my PhD. 
A few years after my PhD, at the University of Twente, I had two great fortunes: 
to find an outstanding boss and an outstanding research institute. 
While being a decent scientist does not actually prevent you from becoming a full
professor, it is certainly not enough. Pieter Hartel is the man who realized the
miracle of turning the itinerant scientist I was seven years ago into someone who
is now reasonably at ease with managing projects, with coaching co-workers, with
starting new research directions and initiatives etc. Pieter, it is hard to put into
words how much I owe you for this and for your friendship. And for fixing the mess
I have been making every now and then. Every time I have a management or
Acknowledgments
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leadership problem my first, second and third thoughts go to you and I try to
imagine how you would handle it if you were in the same situation. Thanks.
I am also grateful to the CTIT – the research institute I participated in in Twente –
and its directors Peter Apers and Iddo Bante. The CTIT contributed substantially to
my development by giving me the lead of both the ‘strategic research orientation’
and the ‘spearhead program’ on security. These are internally funded projects
which together exceed 2 million euro (I was assistant professor at the time). The
money is meant to stimulate research in security by coordinating the efforts of
various chairs working on different aspects of security. This was not only a unique
opportunity for me, but I think it is also a wise manner to influence and
characterize the research of a university.
The chair I now have the privilege of leading is a unique opportunity for which 
I want to thank the Eindhoven University of Technology and the CeDICT, the Centre
for Dependable ICT Systems, one of the Centres of Excellence of 3TU. The Security
chair participates in the security activity of the NIRICT, the Netherlands Institute
for Research on ICT. I am grateful to Jos Baeten for fighting to have a Security chair
at this university, and to the Executive Board for believing in me.
Last but by no means least, the people I work with and have worked with, and in
particular the PhD students: Gabriele, Jordan, Ricardo, Marnix, Ari, Yee-Wei,
Marcin, Ayse, Daniel, Bruno, Jing, Emmanuele and Damiano. You can’t imagine
how important your presence is to me. Without you all, I would have changed job
long ago. 
Ik heb gezegd. 
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